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he decade of the 1990s was a period of dramatic consolidation in
the banking industry. From 1990 to 2000, the number of banking
institutions in the United States fell from 12,212 to 8,252. During
this period, the percent of all banking assets held by the largest 1 percent of
all banks rose from 54 percent to 70 percent. This consolidation was partly
facilitated by the 1994 legislation allowing full interstate branching. Further
legislation in 1999 made consolidation across the broader ﬁnancial services
industry easier by loosening restrictions on the combination of commercial
and investment banking activities in one company.
On its face, the consolidation of the 1990s appears to be part of a longer
wave that began in the mid-1980s. The total number of banks in the United
Stateswasnotablystableataround14,000foranumberofyearspriorto1986,
then began a steady decline. The striking difference in trends is captured in
Figure 1.1 Unsurprisingly, this sustained decline in the number of banks is
associated with an historically high level of merger activity, as seen in Figure
2. These ﬁgures present a picture of structural change in the banking industry
stretching over a period of close to two decades. There is a distinct difference,
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1 The same ﬁgure appears in Ennis (2004), as does a more detailed description of the ag-
gregate trends in failures, mergers, and entry of new banks.
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however, between the earlier and later parts of this period. In the 1980s and
through the recession of the early 1990s, the banking industry was in a period
of crisis, with many undercapitalized or insolvent institutions. Consequently,
there was a peak in the number of bank failures in 1988, and much of the
merger activity represented the acquisition of weak banks by stronger ones.
In contrast to the earlier part of the period, the banking system as a whole has
been well capitalized since the mid-1990s, and bank failures have been few
in number. Further evidence for differences between the two periods can be
seen in the behavior of the concentration of banking assets. As noted above,
the percent of assets held by the top 1 percent of banks rose signiﬁcantly in
the 1990s. Before 1990, however, this measure of aggregate concentration
changed very little.
Given the difference in the overall condition of the banking industry, the
forcesdrivingmergerdecisionsmayhavebeendifferentaroundthetwopeaks
in merger activity in Figure 2. In the earlier part of the period, both acquirers’
strategic considerations and the needs associated with the resolution of weak
institutionswereimportantindeterminingwhatmergersoccurred. Inthelater
part of the period, acquirers’interests were probably predominant. One such
consideration is the desire of an acquiring institution to establish or solidifyJ.A. Weinberg: Banking Markets and Mergers 57
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its position in particular product market segments. That is, a bank with a
large share of some of the markets in which it participates might seek to
enlarge its share through acquisitions, so as to exercise more control over
market prices and enjoy the enhanced proﬁts that come with such market
power. Alternatively,mergersmightbesimplyameansoftransferringbanking
resources from less to more efﬁcient users in response to changes in ﬁrm-
speciﬁc or marketwide conditions. This article explores the effect of the
merger wave of the 1990s on product markets by examining the evolution
of market structure in metropolitan retail banking markets over this period.
Speciﬁcally,thisarticleexploresthechangesinmarketstructuresinﬁveNorth
Carolina metropolitan areas and asks whether these changes shed light on
alternative views of the forces driving mergers.
1. LOCAL BANKING MARKETS
Banksparticipateinmanydistinctmarkets. Theyprovidecredittohouseholds
and businesses, and credit markets can be further segmented along such lines
as the type of household loan (e.g., credit card balances or home-purchase
mortgage) or the size of business borrower. Banks also provide deposit58 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
services and the payment services that come with the provision of check-
able deposits. Finally, banks provide an increasing array of other ﬁnancial
services, either directly or through holding company afﬁliates.
Antitrustpolicytowardbankmergershaslongbeenbasedonthepresump-
tion that bank customers look mainly to nearby institutions for at least some
of the ﬁnancial services they purchase. In particular, attention has centered
on services provided to households and small businesses as being most likely
to be local in nature. While technological innovations and the development
of specialized institutions for some products has certainly made many mar-
kets less geographically limited, recent studies suggest that local institutions
remain important as providers of certain core banking products to these cus-
tomers. Suchproductsincludeconsumerandbusinesscheckabledepositsand
unsecuredlineofcreditlendingtosmallbusinesses. Kwastetal. (1997),inan
analysis of the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances and National
Survey of Small Business Finances, found that these types of customers tend
to have a primary banking relationship with a local institution. Examining in-
terest rates on retail deposit accounts, a number of studies, including Heitﬁeld
and Prager (2004), ﬁnd evidence of market segmentation in the form of rate
differentials at the level of metropolitan areas. Further, they ﬁnd such differ-
ences as recently as 1999, suggesting that markets for such deposit services
continue to be local.
The Federal Reserve’s role in bank merger policy, and that of the other
federal bank regulatory agencies, derives most signiﬁcantly from the Bank
Merger Act, passed in 1960 and amended in 1966. Under this authority,
the Fed examines proposed mergers for possible effects on the competitive
structure and behavior of banking markets. Consistent with the evidence on
the local nature of markets for some retail banking services, this analysis
takes place primarily at the level of local markets. In particular, when there
is geographic overlap between the merging institutions’retail operations, the
Fed assesses the effects of the merger on the degree of concentration in local
markets. For the purposes of this analysis, the Reserve Banks deﬁne banking
markets in their districts. Many of the deﬁned markets coincide with the
metropolitan areas that are used for other statistical purposes.2 In rural areas,
market deﬁnitions attempt to link areas according to where people engage in
a range of economic activities. Such factors as commuting patterns and the
locationofmajorshoppingandhealthcarefacilitiesareimportantfordeﬁning
markets beyond the well-established metropolitan areas.
Theapproachtomergerpolicyadoptedbythebankingregulatoryagencies
was originally based on the view that banking could be deﬁned as a bundle
of services including deposit services and credit to both households and busi-
2 The Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond’s metropolitan area markets are based on the Rand-
McNally designations of “regional metropolitan areas,” or RMAs.J.A. Weinberg: Banking Markets and Mergers 59
nesses. The notion of a ﬁxed bundle of services suggested that the relative
sizes of two banks would be fairly consistent across services. Hence, a mea-
sure of local market concentration in one service, such as deposits, could be
used as a broader measure of concentration in the entire bundle of services.
Changes in ﬁnancial services markets, especially in services to large busi-
nesses and in some consumer credit products, have weakened the connections
amongthevariousservicesinthetraditionalbundle. Still,thecontinuinglocal
nature of markets for retail deposits and small business lending suggests that
the approach of assessing concentration in local deposits continues to have
some validity in measuring concentration and the possible competitive effects
of mergers.3
In North Carolina there are 19 banking markets that correspond to
metropolitan areas, and 48 rural markets. These markets do not cover the
entire state, since a rural area can remain undeﬁned until there is a merger
case involving banks in the area. The metropolitan markets range in size from
Goldsboro,withapopulationjustover113,000,toCharlotte,withapopulation
of over 1.3 million.4 The ﬁve markets examined in this article (and their 2000
metropolitan area populations) are Raleigh (797,071), Greensboro (643,430),
Durham (426,793), Wilmington (274,478), and Rocky Mount (143, 026).
2. CONCENTRATIONAND PRICES
Merger policy is based on the presumption that there is a link between market
concentration and the behavior of market prices. The more concentrated a
market becomes, it is feared, the more likely are market prices to deviate from
thecompetitiveidealandperhapsapproachthepricingofamonopolizedmar-
ket. This concern is founded both on the theory of price-setting in imperfectly
competitive markets and on a long history of empirical studies of the rela-
tionship between market concentration and prices charged or proﬁts earned
by sellers. In banking, a number of studies have found a negative correlation
between concentration in local markets and the interest rates paid on retail
deposit accounts.
Concentration is typically measured by the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI), which is the sum of the squares of sellers’market shares. That is, in a
marketwithN sellers,withselleri’sshareofmarketsales(ordeposits,asmar-
ketsharesaretypicallymeasuredinbanking)denotedbysi, thisconcentration
3 Gilbert and Zaretsky (2003) provide a history and an assessment of the underlying assump-
tions in the approach to merger policy in banking.






The greatest possible HHI, for a fully monopolized market, is 10,000,
while a market consisting of 100 equal-sized sellers would have an HHI of
one. Compared to other potential measures of concentration, for instance, the
total share of the top four ﬁrms in the market, the HHI has the advantage of
beingsensitivetoboththenumberofﬁrmsandtheinequalityofmarketshares
among the active ﬁrms.
The observation that deposit rates paid to retail customers are negatively
correlated with local market concentration is consistent with the hypothesis
that mergers are motivated by the desire of acquirers to gain market share
and pricing power. Analogously, a large literature ﬁnds that, across many
industries, seller concentration is positively correlated with prices and seller
proﬁts.5 These same observations, however, are also consistent with a very
different theory of the determination of market structure. A critique of the
market-power-basedhypothesis,originatingwithDemsetz(1973),arguesthat
the observed correlations between concentration and proﬁts or prices could
emergeevenifnoﬁrmseverexercisedanymarketpower. Considertwodistinct
markets with similar demand conditions. In each market, sellers and potential
entrants have access to a production technology with decreasing returns to
scale (for large enough output levels) and ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity factors
that result in cost differences across ﬁrms. These factors, which may arise
from unique talents of personnel or from locational factors, give some sellers
cost advantages that cannot be replicated by competitors, at least in the short
run. Now, if in one market, these ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors tend to be fairly similar
across ﬁrms (and potential entrants), then in a competitive equilibrium, ﬁrms
inthismarketwillhaverelativelyequalmarketshares. Further, withlowcosts
of entry, all ﬁrms’ proﬁts and prices will be prevented from rising far above
normalcompetitivelevels. Contrastthissituationwithamarketinwhichﬁrm-
speciﬁc productivity factors vary widely. Now sellers with a cost advantage
will enjoy larger shares of market sales. Competitive forces will only drive
down the proﬁts of marginal sellers (those with relatively high costs). Low-
cost ﬁrms will earn higher proﬁts. In short, greater inequality in costs across
ﬁrms will lead to both greater concentration of total market sales and higher
average proﬁts.
What implications does the critique of the market-power hypothesis have
regarding the relationship between prices and concentration? The connection
here is not as clear as in the case of concentration and proﬁts, and the answer
5 Gilbert and Zaretsky (2003) provide an excellent review of the literature on banking markets.J.A. Weinberg: Banking Markets and Mergers 61
is likely to depend on additional characteristics of the markets in question.
Plausiblemodelsofmarketbehaviormightimplyeitherapositiveoranegative
correlation between concentration and prices. One such speciﬁcation that
implies a positive correlation replaces or supplements the assumption of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc variation in costs with an assumption of ﬁrm-speciﬁc variation in
product characteristics. A seller who is industrious and fortunate enough to
produce a product more desirable than its competitors’ will enjoy a larger
market share and greater proﬁts, and will be able to sell at a higher price. As
before, a market with a more unequal distribution of product qualities will be
more concentrated and have higher average proﬁts, as well as higher average
prices.
In banking, one characteristic that appears to matter for attracting retail
deposit customers is location. A bank with a more convenient location may
be able to attract deposits while offering a lower interest rate than its competi-
tors. Further,bankswithmultiplelocationsmayhaveacompetitiveadvantage,
suggesting that size and product quality are somewhat complementary char-
acteristics within a banking market. This dimension of locational advantage,
combined with ﬁrm-speciﬁc differences in the costs of managing multiple-
location networks could then result in a distribution of banks according to
size, proﬁts, and prices (interest rates). The expected correlations of rates,
proﬁts, and concentration would then correspond with those found in cross-
market regressions.
So are the observed correlations in banking between local concentration
and prices (deposit rates) driven by market power or by competition among
heterogeneous sellers? A deﬁnitive answer to this question would be difﬁcult
toﬁnd, anditislikelythatboththeseforcesareatworkinactualbankingmar-
kets. But even if purely competitive forces play an important role in driving
these cross-market differences, a merger policy based on limiting concen-
tration could still be warranted. Even if large market shares result from the
product or cost advantages that some ﬁrms have over others, a ﬁrm with large
market share is more likely to be capable of exercising market power over
prices and earning economic proﬁts at the cost of reduced consumer welfare
and overall market efﬁciency. A merger policy that recognizes the possibility
ofcostefﬁcienciesarisingfromsomelargemergerscanalsorecognizethatthe
resulting costs in terms of increased market power could outweigh the gains.
3. MERGERSAND MARKET STRUCTURE
Do mergers lead to increasingly concentrated markets? The trivial answer
to this question is yes, in the short run. The immediate effect of a merger
between two sellers operating in overlapping markets is that, in the areas of
overlap, the total amount of business in the market is divided among a smaller
set of competitors than before the merger. Beyond this simple response, the62 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
studyofhowmergersaffectmarketstructureandopportunitiesfortheexercise
of market power involves two theoretical questions regarding the behavior of
imperfectly competitive markets. First, can two ﬁrms in a market increase
their pricing power and proﬁts by combining? Second, what are the long-
run effects of a merger on market structure, once competitors’responses and
the dynamic behavior of the merging ﬁrms have been taken into account?
The second of these questions inherently refers to dynamic models of market
behavior, while the ﬁrst can be (and has been) addressed in the context of
either a static or a dynamic model.
Several papers study the question of whether two ﬁrms in an imperfectly
competitive market can increase their joint proﬁts by merging. The answer
dependsonthenatureofthestrategicinteractionamongﬁrms. Onepossibility,
pointed out by Salant et al. (1983), is that a reduction in the number of sellers
through a merger could cause other rivals to seek to beneﬁt by increasing
their own output. These output increases offset the merger’s effect on the
market price, eliminating any gains for the merging parties. Under alternative
models of strategic behavior, other authors have identiﬁed conditions under
which the merger partners do indeed beneﬁt. Denekere and Davidson (1985),
for instance, show that under price competition (with differentiated products),
the merger causes other rivals to raise their own prices, leading to gains for
everyone, including the merging ﬁrms.
Perry and Porter (1985) consider a model of asymmetric competition
among sellers with increasing marginal costs that depend on ﬁrms’productive
capacity. They assume that capacity is tied to physical assets and that there
is a ﬁxed amount of such assets available to the sellers in the market.6 These
assumptions have the effect of limiting the competitors’increase in output in
response to rising prices. As a result, two ﬁrms can ﬁnd it proﬁtable to merge,
reduce their combined outputs, and enjoy the resulting higher prices. Asym-
metry in the initial distribution of the productive capacity among the sellers
can reinforce this result, making it particularly attractive for two relatively
large sellers to merge.
Perry and Porter’s analysis can be viewed as a bridge between a static and
a dynamic model of market competition. In fact, with freely variable capacity
and constant returns to scale, their model is identical to that of Salant et al. If
increasing capacity is subject to adjustment costs, and ﬁrms make dynamic,
strategic investment decisions, the steady state of the model’s equilibrium, for
a given number of ﬁrms, would coincide with the equilibrium of the standard
Cournotmodel. Comparingproﬁtsacrosssteadystateswithdifferentnumbers
of ﬁrms, then, would give the impression that mergers are not proﬁtable, as
in Salant et al. But adjustment costs give rise to a transition period, during
6Alternatively, they assume that the adjustment costs associated with acquiring and installing
new productive capacity are high.J.A. Weinberg: Banking Markets and Mergers 63
which the merged ﬁrms can beneﬁt, as in Perry and Porter. Gowrisankaran
(1999) studies mergers in dynamic oligopoly models.
Alloftheseinvestigationsofmergerincentivesinimperfectlycompetitive
markets share the assumption that changes in market structure do not change
the manner in which prices are determined. In all of the foregoing cases, the
prices resulting from a given market structure are the equilibrium outcomes
of static noncooperative behavior, whether price-setting or quantity-setting.
It’s possible that dynamic interaction among sellers in a concentrated market
could enable sellers to sustain higher prices than those associated with static
noncooperative equilibrium. If the feasibility of such tacit collusion depends
onmarketconcentration, thentheincentivesformergerstogainmarketpower
could be considerably strengthened. This type of motivation would tend to
favormergersamongsellersthatarealreadyfairlylargerelativetothemarket.
In many actual banking markets, especially relatively large markets like
those examined in the next section, some participants are small enough so
that one can reasonably assume that they do not exercise market power. Such
markets might best be represented as having some ﬁrms with market power
and a “competitive fringe” of price-taking ﬁrms. Gowrisankaran and Holmes
(2000) investigate mergers in a dynamic dominant ﬁrm model. For a given
initial distribution of productive capacity between the dominant ﬁrm and the
fringe, they examine the equilibrium path of investment in new capacity and
purchase of capacity from the fringe by the dominant ﬁrm (mergers). They
ﬁnd that the tendency of the market to become more concentrated over time
depends on the initial concentration. Speciﬁcally, the greater the dominant
ﬁrm’s initial market share, the more likely the dominant ﬁrm will grow by
acquiring capacity from the fringe.
In the studies of merger incentives discussed in this section, the driving
forceisthedesiretoproﬁtbytheexerciseofmarketpower. Thisbodyofwork
suggests that such a motivation for mergers is plausible in a variety of market
settings, even though entry and growth by smaller ﬁrms will eventually erode
themonopolyproﬁtsacquired. Stigler’s(1950)characterizationofthemerger
waves of the early 20th century was consistent with this view. He shows in
particularhowmergersinmanyindustriescreatedﬁrmswithdominantmarket
shares, only to have those dominant positions dwindle over time.
The forgoing discussion focused on studies of merger incentives where
the primary motivation was the acquisition or maintenance of market power.
But what if market structure is driven by the relative efﬁciencies of compet-
ing ﬁrms, rather than by the desire to gain market power? What does this
alternative approach imply about the causes and consequences of mergers?
In a dynamic version of such a model, like that in Hopenhayn (1992), ﬁrms
and their market shares grow or decline as their ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics64 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 1 Population and Population Growth 1990–2000
Market 1990 Population 2000 Population Percent Growth
Raleigh 541,100 797,071 47.3
Greensboro 540,030 643,430 19.1
Durham 344,625 426,793 23.8
Wilmington 200,124 274,478 37.2
Rocky Mount 133,235 143,026 7.3
evolve.7 A ﬁrm that has a productivity advantage at one point in time may see
that advantage diminish over time. Such a model predicts market shares that
rise or fall but does not distinguish between growth through new investment
and growth through acquisition. One can imagine a model in which both in-
ternal growth (new investment) and external growth (acquisition) are subject
to adjustment costs. The relative costs of the two forms of growth, together
with the evolution of ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity factors, would then determine
the joint pattern of investment and mergers.
4. FIVE NORTH CAROLINA MARKETS
This section examines the behavior of market shares in ﬁve North Carolina
metropolitanmarketsfrom1991to2002. TheﬁvemarketsstudiedareDurham,
Greensboro, Raleigh, Rocky Mount, and Wilmington. These metropolitan
areas range in 2000 population from Rocky Mount with 143,026 to Raleigh
with 797,021. These two cities, respectively, also had the slowest and fastest
population growth of the group between 1990 and 2002. Population and pop-
ulation growth ﬁgures for these metropolitan areas are given in Table 1.
This group of markets does not include all the largest banking markets
in the state. Most notably, Charlotte and Winston-Salem are not included.
Both of these cities housed the headquarters of banks that were among the
10 largest in the United States during this period. Charlotte was the home
of Nationsbank, which merged with Bank of America in 1999 to become the
second largest bank holding company in the United States, with the combined
BankofAmericaheadquarteredinCharlotte. Charlotteisalsotheheadquarter
city of Wachovia, the fourth largest bank holding company. Winston-Salem
was previously the home of Wachovia until it was acquired by First Union
(keeping the Wachovia name for the combined institution) in 2001. The
status of these cities as headquarters for very large institutions complicates
7 Erickson and Pakes (1995) provide a dynamic model that includes both imperfect compe-
tition and stochastically varying ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivities. While that model does not address
mergers, it could form the basis of a general treatment of merger incentives.J.A. Weinberg: Banking Markets and Mergers 65
Table 2 Banking Market Characteristics in 1990
Market Deposits/ HHI Leading Bank’s 5 Largest Banks’
Population Share (%) Share (%)
Raleigh $9,990 786 15.66 45.02
Greensboro $11,780 747 15.05 48.13
Durham $8,800 1286 24.15 63.50
Wilmington $9,310 1008 19.98 54.13
Rocky Mount $16,690 1365 25.84 64.89
the interpretation of the deposit data on which market concentration informa-
tion is based. These data are drawn from the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits
and are based on banks’ reported allocations of their total deposits to their
various ofﬁces. Large banks that serve large corporate customers may have
deposits booked in their headquarter locations that come from more widely
dispersed customers. This tendency may have become particularly important
after interstate banking powers were expanded by 1994 legislation. The ob-
jective of studying market concentration in geographically deﬁned markets is
to examine the extent to which relatively few banks dominate a market for
local business. For the headquarter cities of large banks, a substantial portion
of reported deposits may represent nonlocal business.
Table2summarizessomecharacteristicsofthesebankingmarketsin1990.
With the exception of Rocky Mount, the markets are similar in terms of de-
posits relative to population, around $10,000 of deposits per capita. In terms
of market concentration, all ﬁve markets were either unconcentrated (HHI
less than 1,000) or moderately concentrated (HHI between 1,000 and 1,800),
as deﬁned by the Department of Justice’s merger guidelines. The leading
bank’s market share ranged from around 15 percent in Greensboro to nearly
26 percent in Rocky Mount. These 1990 market structures fall into three
groups. Greensboro and Raleigh appear similar, with HHI less than 800 and
the leading ﬁrm’s share in each market around 15 percent. The “four ﬁrm
concentration ratios”—the combined market share of the four largest ﬁrms in
the market—are also similar for Greensboro and Raleigh. These are the two
largestmetropolitanareasbypopulation, consistentwiththegeneraltendency
for concentration to be decreasing in city size. The two most concentrated of
thisgroupofmarketsin1990wereDurhamandRockyMount. RockyMount,
the most concentrated, is also the smallest of these metropolitan areas. Wil-
mington’s market concentration characteristics lie between the other pairs of
markets.
The differences among the market structures are consistent with evidence
that metropolitan areas constitute distinct retail deposit markets. Given that
several banks are signiﬁcant participants in many or all of these cities, one
might expect that large, statewide banks would have similar positions in66 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
different cities if the market were integrated on a statewide basis. Instead,
in 1990 four different banks had the largest market shares in the ﬁve cities.
While there are some respects in which the market structures of these cities
become more similar over the time period, individual banks’positions remain
quite different across the markets.
Between 1991 and 2002, there were 45 mergers involving banks that
participated in at least one of these markets.8 Over 80 percent of these were
truly horizontal mergers, meaning that the merging banks were competitors
in at least one market prior to the acquisition. The remaining transactions
are better characterized as market extension mergers, in that they involved the
purchaseofabankinamarketinwhichtheacquirerhadnopreviouspresence.
In 13 cases, the merging banks had overlapping activities in more than one of
the markets. Transactions vary in size from Southern National Bank of North
Carolina’s 1993 purchase of East Coast Savings Bank, which had a single
ofﬁce in Raleigh with deposits of $6.5 million, to the 2002 merger of First
Union and Wachovia, which had overlapping activities in all of ﬁve markets,
with combined deposits ranging from around $370 million in Rocky Mount
to nearly $3 billion in Raleigh.
How did this decade of mergers affect the market structures in these
metropolitan areas? Figures 3–6 present information on the evolution of mar-
ket characteristics from 1990 to 2002. Figure 3 begins with the number of
banks operating in this market. In all markets, this period saw a substantial
decline in the number of banks. There has also been entry of new banks in
all of the markets, with net gains in the number of banks coming toward the
end of the period. While all of the markets had fewer banks in 2002 than in
1990, markets did not necessarily receive fewer banking services. As shown
in Figure 4, changes in the number of ofﬁces (branches) were generally not
as dramatic as changes in the number of banks. Rocky Mount experienced
a fairly substantial decline in ofﬁces (about 25 percent), and Raleigh saw a
large increase (about 14 percent). In the other markets the number of ofﬁces
changed very little (less than 3 percent). It is true that deposits per capita fell
slightly in all but one (Rocky Mount) of the markets. While this decline could
be due to an overall reduction in supply of deposit services, it is just as likely
the result of increasing competition from nonlocal banks or nonbank ﬁnancial
service providers for some segments of customers.
Figures 5 and 6 turn more directly to measures of market concentration.
Figure5showstheevolutionoftheHHIforeachmarket. Overall, themarkets
appear to be more similar at the end of the period than at the beginning,
with the two least concentrated markets at the beginning of the period having
experienced the largest increases in concentration. But a large part of the
8 This count includes commercial bank and thrift acquisitions.J.A. Weinberg: Banking Markets and Mergers 67

















Union-Wachovia merger. These two banks each had market shares in excess
of 10 percent in both of these markets at the time of the merger. Differences
in concentration across these markets appear to be fairly persistent before the
last observation in the data. Markets that start out more concentrated remain
more concentrated.
Figure 6 underscores the importance of the First Union-Wachovia merger
for the Raleigh and Greensboro markets. This ﬁgure shows the market share
of the leading bank in each market.9 In Raleigh and Greensboro, this number
changes very little until the last year in the data. A single transaction also
plays a large role in the Wilmington market. The relevant merger in this case
is BB&T’s purchase of United Carolina Bank in 1997. Durham displays a
steadyincreasethroughouttheperiod, asdoesRockyMountintheﬁrstpartof
the period, after which the top ﬁrm’s share declines. In general, the behavior
of the top seller’s market share seems more idiosyncratic than the broader
measure of concentration.
9 Note that the identity of the leading bank in a market can change over time.68 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
















How do the observed patterns in these ﬁve markets relate to theoretical
viewsonthemotivationsforandeffectsofmergers? First,notethatthepersis-
tence of differences in concentration across markets suggests that, whatever
the forces driving consolidation, local factors are important in determining
local market structures. There does not appear to be a unique structure toward
which these markets are converging. Also, it is important to bear in mind that
banking markets in the United States operate under an existing merger policy
thatlimitsthedegreeofconcentrationthatonemightexpecttoobserve. Merg-
ersthatwouldcreatetoomuchconcentrationmightnotbeallowed,ormightbe
allowed subject to the sale of some of the combined company’s branches to a
third party. So if there was a tendency, for instance, for all banking markets to
eventually become monopolies, that tendency would not show up in the data.
Still, these markets are, for the most part, below the level of concentration at
which merger policy tends to intervene, and there is not strong evidence that
less concentrated markets are consolidating faster than those that are already
more concentrated.
While differences between markets seem to persist, it is the case that
all of the markets have become more concentrated. Broadly speaking, this
rising concentration is consistent with the models of merger incentives inJ.A. Weinberg: Banking Markets and Mergers 69
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imperfectly competitive markets. Some of these models, Perry and Porter
(1985) and Holmes and Gowrisankaran (2000) in particular, suggest that the
incentive for a market’s large participants to grow by acquisition is increasing
in the initial level of concentration. This feature does not appear to be present
in the cases examined here. Those same models, however, suggest that the
increasing incentives may display a threshold effect, changing discretely once
concentration becomes big enough. It is possible then, that all of the markets
examined are on the same side of the relevant threshold.
The behavior of the leading ﬁrms’ market shares (Figure 6) contains an
interesting mix of patterns. Two of the markets (Rocky Mount and Wilming-
ton) evolve in a way that seems consistent with Stigler’s (1950) evidence on
early merger waves. A leading ﬁrm in a market increases its share through
acquisition, and then sees its share decline over time. This pattern suggests
an environment in which, due to entry and adjustment costs, gaining mar-
ket power through acquisition is possible, but only temporarily. In two other
markets (Raleigh and Greensboro), the large increase in the leading ﬁrm’s
share comes at the end of the period, so it’s not possible to say whether these
markets will follow the same pattern. The last market shows a sustained70 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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increase in the leading ﬁrm’s share, which seems consistent with Holmes and
Gowrisankaran’s model of a dominant ﬁrm growing through acquisition.
While the behavior of these markets’structures is consistent with models
in which mergers are motivated by the prospect of gains in market power,
they are also consistent with the view that mergers are one of the means by
whichanindustryevolvestowardanefﬁcientallocationofproductivecapacity
amongﬁrmswithheterogeneouscharacteristics. Giventhesustainedincreases
in concentration in these markets, one might conclude that the entire period
from 1990 to 2002 represents part of a transition from one steady state market
structure to another. This view seems consistent with the behavior of the
aggregate number of banks, as shown in Figure 1.
5. CONCLUSION
The title of this article includes the phrase “preliminary examination,” and
the article has attempted to view the evolution of market structures in light of
alternative theoretical perspectives on the motives for mergers. The ﬁndings
suggest that observed behavior of markets is consistent either with a theory
based on the acquisition of market power or one based on the efﬁcient allo-J.A. Weinberg: Banking Markets and Mergers 71
cation of productive capacity in local banking markets. A less preliminary
analysis of this topic might proceed in one of two ways. First, one could pro-
ceedwithamoredetailedanalysisofasmallnumberofmarkets. Suchastudy
wouldconsiderdetailsofthelocaleconomiesthatmightaffectthedemandfor
banking services. Important factors may include information about business
activities and changes in local labor market conditions. Differences in such
demand characteristics are likely to be important for explaining differences in
concentration across markets or over time. Accounting for such factors could
give one insight into the extent to which changes in market structure represent




(1999) constitutes an important contribution. These authors propose models
thatincorporatebothmarketpower(imperfectcompetition)andthepossibility
for efﬁciency reasons to drive differences in ﬁrm size and market share. Such
models create the potential for the data to speak more directly to the relative
importance of the various forces driving consolidation in markets.
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